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Brief of Petitioner 
INTRODUCTION 
  Defendant shot his wife three times at point-blank range, killing her.  
He never disputed that he fired the fatal shots. Instead, his defense at trial 
was that the jury should convict him of manslaughter because he shot his 
wife under extreme emotional distress:  Their contentious relationship, along 
with a recent escalation in tensions, allegedly caused him to snap.  He 
testified that in the weeks before the shooting, he and his wife had been 
fighting worse than ever; that his wife threatened him days earlier; and that 
when he saw her gun was missing from the gun safe, he was overwhelmed 
with fear and anger.  He was convicted of murder. 
 Defendant testified that three days before he killed his wife, she had 
threatened him, and that when he saw her by their gun safe and noticed that 
a Beretta was missing, he took the threat seriously and believed that she 
-2- 
meant to harm him.  When Defendant tried to testify about the exact words 
of his wife’s alleged threat, however, the State objected that those words were 
inadmissible hearsay.  Defense counsel did not counter that the exact words 
were admissible non-hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted.  The trial court sustained the State’s objection, so the jury 
never heard the alleged threat’s exact words.   
 On appeal, Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for not 
making the non-hearsay argument.  The court of appeals agreed, reasoning 
that defense counsel was deficient because admitting the specific words of 
the threat—which are not part of the record—would only have strengthened 
his defense.  The court of appeals also held that Defendant was prejudiced 
because the jury may have remained deadlocked had it heard the threat’s 
specific words, which again, are not part of the record.  
 The court of appeals erred and this Court should reverse. First, the 
court of appeals failed to hold Defendant to the Strickland deficient 
performance standard, under which the determinative question is whether 
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable. Because the court of 
appeals failed to conduct this analysis, and thereby incorrectly concluded 
that counsel was deficient, it erred. Likewise, the court of appeals’ conclusion 
-3- 
that counsel performed deficiently was not supported by the record because 
the specific words of the threat were not in the record.  
 The court of appeals also erroneously concluded that Defendant was 
prejudiced. Without knowing the content of Teresa’s alleged threat, the court 
of appeals impermissibly speculated that the content of the threat was both 
serious and would have affected the outcome of the proceeding. Also, the 
court of appeals did not evaluate the totality of the evidence before the jury, 
but instead considered evidence of Teresa’s alleged threat in isolation. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1.  Did the court of appeals apply an incorrect standard for determining 
whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)? 
 2.  Did the court of appeals incorrectly relieve Defendant of his burden 
to prove Strickland prejudice as a demonstrable reality on the record 
evidence? 
 Standard of Review for Issues 1 and 2. On certiorari, this Court reviews a 
court of appeals’ decision for correctness.  State v. Lowther, 2017 UT 34, ¶17, 
398 P.3d 1032. 
-4- 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts.1 
 When teenaged brothers Jack and John learned that there were police 
cars in front of their Salem, Utah home, their first thought was that their 
father, Defendant, had “finally” killed their mother, Teresa. R.279:100, 108, 
124. They were right. Defendant had just called 911 to report that he had shot 
and killed his wife. R.280:62; State’s Ex.1. When the dispatcher asked what 
had happened, Defendant calmly explained that he shot Teresa after she “got 
off the phone with her mother complaining about” Defendant, “telling how 
she’s tired of it and this and that.” R.280:63; State’s Ex.1. Defendant said that 
he and Teresa had “been fighting for the last two weeks, almost straight,” and 
that Teresa had been “trying to take a picture” of him. R.280:63-64; State’s 
Ex.1. But now, Defendant told the dispatcher, Teresa was dead. R.280:64; 
State’s Ex.1. 
 Responding officers found Teresa in the master bedroom sitting on the 
bed, semi-reclined.  R.277:131. Her legs were before her, her slippered feet 
                                              
1 The State uses the pseudonyms “Jack” and “John” for the children’s 
names. 
The record is paginated in chronological order, but in reverse.  The 
transcripts, however, are paginated in ascending order. The State’s brief uses 
the order in which they appear—descending in the record, ascending in the 
transcripts.     
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crossed at the ankle. Id. Her cell phone was next to her and crochet work lay 
on her lap.  Id.   
 Defendant had shot Teresa three times.  R.277:135, 140.  One bullet 
entered the left corner of her mouth and lodged in her esophagus.  R.278:46.  
Another entered under her chin and exited the right side of her neck.  
R.278:49.  The third bullet entered her chest, passed through her heart, and 
exited out her back.  R.278:51-53.  Because Teresa had gunpowder stippling 
over the back of her right hand, which is caused by “unburnt gunpowder 
particles as they come out of the muzzle of the gun,” the medical examiner 
concluded that Teresa had been shot from a couple feet away.  R.278:54, 64.   
 Officers recovered two guns from the home.  The one Defendant used 
to shoot Teresa, a black handgun, was lying on the floor near the front door. 
R.277:45-46, 87, 116, 146, 150-152, 179, 186-187; State’s Exs. 5-7. They found 
another gun, a loaded silver Beretta, in the master bedroom lying on the 
lower right corner of the bed—the far opposite corner from where Teresa had 
been sitting.  R.277:125, 134, 137-138; State’s Ex.9-10.  A holster lay on top of 
it.  R.277:135, 160-161; State’s Ex.10.   
 Officers also found a portable gun safe in the master bedroom “poking 
out underneath the dresser” near the bedroom door. R.277:125-126; State’s 
Ex.11.  It was “open, nothing in it.”  R.277:126, 171.   
-6- 
A history of domestic violence 
 At trial, the State presented evidence that Defendant and Teresa had a 
difficult relationship, characterized by Defendant emotionally and physically 
abusing Teresa. 
 Defendant and Teresa had been married nineteen years. R.278:86, 134.  
During that time, Defendant worked full-time fixing school buses for the local 
school district. R.278:213-214. Teresa worked part-time cleaning houses, at 
Wal-Mart, and with her parents. R.278:94-95; R.279:47. Teresa also took care 
of their home and their two boys, Jack and John, and managed their finances.  
R.278:92-94, 140, 147-148. Teresa had gone back to school and earned a 
business degree, but she had yet to find a steady, full-time job. R.278:92-94, 
140, 147. And while friends and family knew that Defendant and Teresa 
argued often—usually about finances—they believed it was no more than 
“any other married couple.” R.278:195-196, 202-206, 211, 215-217; 279:42, 48, 
65, 119.   
 Jack and John, however, knew that things were worse than that. Things 
at home were “rocky and rough.” R.279:77.  They witnessed many fights, and 
believed Defendant was “responsible” for most of them. R.279:127. While 
Teresa would get mad and yell, Defendant got “aggressive” and “physical.” 
R.279:82, 90-91. Once they saw Defendant throw a towel at Teresa’s face and 
-7- 
start “punching her in the gut.” R.279:90-91, 116. Another time Defendant 
“slammed” the vacuum into Teresa’s legs. R.279:118. But they never saw 
Teresa “get physical” with Defendant. R.297:91. Nor did they hear Teresa call 
Defendant names or threaten him.  R.279:82, 117, 127. 
 They did, however, hear Defendant threaten to kill Teresa “multiple 
times.” R.279:82, 86, 117; R.278:150.  He promised Teresa that “‘one of these 
days I’m going to kill you.’” R.279:82, 86, 117; R.278:150. And he almost made 
good on that promise before he shot her. With Jack and John in the backseat, 
Defendant tried to run Teresa over with their SUV, but Teresa was able to 
jump out of the way.  R.279:88, 115.   
 During most every argument, Defendant told Teresa that “she was 
worthless.” R.279:116, 127. He berated her for “putting out no effort to . . . go 
get a job.” R.278:94. And he would “cuss” at her “a lot,” calling her names 
like “bitch” or “just anything to put her down, that could hurt her and make 
her feel like she was a bad person.” R.279:82, 86, 117; R.278:150. He even 
taunted Teresa that she “like[s] to do it with [her] relatives” because she had 
been sexually abused as a child.  R.279:50-51.  And he used the contact name 
“Bitch Teresa” for her in his cell phone. R.278:150; State’s Ex.29 (Defendant’s 
cell phone records).   
-8- 
 Teresa called the police for help a few times. R.278:88; R.279:91. One 
time, Defendant’s “best” friend since childhood, Officer Howell, responded. 
R.278:3-4, 13. But he just took Defendant on a ride so that Defendant could 
“cool off.” 278:17, 27.   
 After one call to the police though, Defendant was arrested, and he 
pleaded guilty to domestic violence assault.  R.278:88-89, 152.  Afterwards, 
Teresa obtained a protective order and they separated temporarily. R.278:89-
90, 157.  But they soon got back together.  R.278:90, 158.  
 In the months before Teresa’s death, one neighbor, Dorothy, believed 
that “something was very wrong.” R.279:34. When she visited Teresa at 
home, Teresa was “never” comfortable, but “was always nervous” and 
“always . . . looking around.”  R.279:30-31. One time when Dorothy came 
over, Teresa was “crying and shaking” and “distraught.” R.279:34-35. 
Dorothy also witnessed Defendant harangue Teresa for not getting a job for 
which she had applied. R.279:36. And another time, when Dorothy dropped 
Teresa home, Defendant “came charging out of the house and threw [the car] 
door open.” R.279:34-35.  He yelled, “‘What do you think you’re doing?’” and 
ordered Teresa to “‘[g]et in the house.’” Id.   
-9- 
 After that, it became “extremely hard” for Dorothy to “get ahold” of 
Teresa. R.279:32. Whenever Dorothy called or came over to the house, 
Defendant would tell her that Teresa was sick or sleeping.  R.279:32-33.   
The murder 
 On the day that Defendant killed Teresa, Teresa’s mother, Marsha, 
talked to Teresa on the phone for about 40 minutes. R.279:52, 56. Towards the 
end of the conversation, Marsha heard Defendant pick up the other handset 
to listen in. R.279:53. Teresa was telling her mother that Defendant had “been 
driving reckless again” and that she was “disappointed.” R.279:56, 62. 
Marsha heard Defendant exclaim, “My wife and my mother-in-law are 
saying bad things about me.” R.279:53-54, 57. Seventeen minutes later, 
Defendant called 911. State’s Ex.29. Teresa was dead.  
 When officers responded, Defendant complied with their orders and 
showed no emotion.  R.277:42, 62, 69, 72, 91; R.278:10.  He answered their 
questions about where Teresa was, where his gun was, and explained that his 
sons were at friends’ houses.  R.277:43, 49, 70, 90-91.  When Defendant’s 
friend Officer Howell arrived later, however, Defendant became upset and 
cried.  R.277:82, 92-93; R.278:9, 20. Defendant told Officer Howell that he 
“‘thought it would be worth it, but it’s not.’”  R.278:30.   
-10- 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
 Defendant was charged with domestic violence murder.  See R.3-2.   
The defense 
 Defendant did not contest that he killed Teresa. R.277:19; R.278:161; 
R.280:48. Rather, he argued that the jury should convict him of the reduced 
charge of manslaughter because he had acted under extreme emotional 
distress. R.277:19, 27.  He claimed that he “just [got] to the end of his rope” 
and shot Teresa in a fit of fear and rage. Id. Defense counsel declared in his 
opening statement that “it’s more serious for somebody to think about, plan 
out, coldly and calmly kill somebody. And it is less serious if somebody does 
it under what is called extreme emotional distress.”  Id.  Defense counsel told 
the jury that he would present evidence that Defendant and Teresa fought 
constantly and that in the weeks before the shooting, their fighting 
“escalated.” R.277:24. It had gotten so bad, defense counsel stated, that the 
day before the shooting, Defendant called his mother and said, “‘Mom I’m 
afraid. The gun safe is open and a gun is missing. And I think Teresa is going 
to kill me.’” R.277:25. Then, when he heard Teresa talking to her mother on 
the phone the next day, “hamm[ing] it up” and trying to “twist the screws 
and antagonize him,” defense counsel claimed, Defendant snapped and shot 
her. R.277:27.  
-11- 
 In support of the theory that he laid out in his opening statement, 
defense counsel called Defendant’s mother, his two brothers, and three co-
workers to testify. R.278:171, 192, 201, 213-214, 224, 234. Defendant testified 
as well. R.278:82-170. They all painted Teresa as a nag who pushed 
Defendant’s buttons and would not let things go. For example, Defendant’s 
childhood friend Officer Howell testified that Defendant told him that Teresa 
“would just kind of nitpick and push and just not let stuff go.” R.278:19, 28. 
Defendant’s mother also testified that Defendant and Teresa had a 
“love/hate relationship” where “they really loved each other but they 
couldn’t get along.” R.278:172. They fought “over money” because Teresa 
would buy things that they could not afford. R.278:189. And before the 
shooting, their fighting was “bad.” R.278:176, 186. 
 Defendant’s brothers testified that Defendant and Teresa “would fight 
a lot and argue” about money. R.278:193, 196. One of the brothers said that 
he once saw Teresa yell at Defendant, but Defendant just ignored her. 
R.278:204-205. The other brother testified that about three days before the 
shooting, he talked to Defendant on the phone and although Defendant 
“didn’t confide” in him, Defendant seemed “really distraught.” R.278:196.  
 Defendant’s coworkers also testified that they had heard Defendant 
fighting with Teresa on the phone while he was at work. R.278:216, 225, 235.  
-12- 
They said that Teresa would call every so often, but she called “multiple times 
weekly” in the month before the shooting. R.278:220, 226-227. One time, a 
coworker noticed that when Defendant hung up on Teresa while she was 
yelling, she called back, and then came to the shop. R.278:236. Another 
coworker testified that the night before the shooting, Defendant called to ask 
if he could come and stay with him. R.278:218-219. The coworker agreed, 
observing that Defendant seemed “upset.” R.278:219.  
 Defense counsel elicited on cross-examination of the responding 
officers that although Defendant was calm and collected when they first 
arrived, at some point after he was handcuffed and arrested, he became “very 
emotional and distraught.” R.277:61-62, 64, 93; R.278:20-21. 
 Defendant also testified.  R.278:82-170.  He said that in the two weeks 
before the shooting, he and Teresa argued constantly. R.278:103.  According 
to him, the fights were worse than they had ever been, the “get in your face, 
yell, scream at each other, spit flying” kind of fighting.  R.278:107, 159-160.  
He said that they fought because Teresa was angry at Defendant for many 
reasons: he bought the boys and himself guns with their tax return money, 
R.278:94; Defendant was restoring a car with Jack, but Teresa thought it cost 
too much money, R.278:97-98; Defendant wanted to take the boys camping 
but Teresa said they did not have enough money to go, R.278:105; Defendant 
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drove Teresa’s car to work, R.278:106; and when Defendant drove the SUV 
instead, it used too much gas, R.278:107.  
   Defendant testified that on Friday, the day before the shooting, 
Teresa’s mother called and he took the phone to Teresa in the bedroom.  
R.278:110.  He said that when he walked in, he saw Teresa sitting on a stool 
“in front of the bed crouched down.”  R.278:111.  The gun safe had been 
pulled out from under the dresser, it was open, and “there was only one pistol 
sitting there.”  R.278:112.  Normally, both his gun and Teresa’s silver Beretta 
were in the safe. R.278:116, 161, 167-168.  But now, the Beretta was gone. Id. 
“Having seen that the gun was missing,” Defendant testified that he was 
“scared to death” and “worried that Teresa was going to use that gun to do 
some harm” to him. R.278:117. Defendant worried especially because 
“Wednesday there was a threat made.  And so when [he] came in and seen 
that, [he] thought the threat was serious.”  R.278:113.  Defendant said that he 
left the bedroom and called his mother to tell her what he had seen. R.278:118. 
But after the kids came home, he “felt a little more comfortable,” and that 
they “kind of just floated through the night.”  R.278:120. He took Ambien and 
went to sleep with Teresa that night. R.278:121. 
     Defendant testified that the next day, Saturday, he was “still feeling 
scared.” R.278:121. He helped a neighbor with his car, went to a haircut 
-14- 
appointment, and went to his work to put some new tires on Teresa’s car.  
R.278:121.  Afterward, he “really didn’t want to go home” so he called a co-
worker and asked if he could stay at his house for the night.  R.278:122, 166.  
His co-worker agreed, but Defendant went home instead.  R.278:123.  There, 
Defendant testified, he moved some vehicles and cleaned up an oil spill, 
fighting with Teresa the “whole time.” R.278:125. He said that Teresa was 
upset that he “kept rubbing the fence” when he moved the vehicles, that he 
had spilled oil on the driveway, and that he had gotten the wrong sized tires 
for her car. R.278:108-109, 124-125.  
 When Defendant went inside to use the master bathroom, he saw that 
the gun safe “was pulled out again from underneath . . . the dresser” and it 
was “open with one pistol in it.”  R.278:126-127.  Teresa’s silver Beretta was 
missing again.  R.278:163.   
   Defendant testified that he left the house and “went to the bathroom in 
a ditch out back in the corner” because he “didn’t dare go back in the house.”  
R.278:127.  He stayed in the garage.  R.278:128.  But “the house door to the 
garage would come open” and “Teresa would be leaning out the door and 
just staring at [him] and so [he] just was kind of freaking out.”  R.278:128-129.  
Although he did not see it, he believed Teresa had the gun with her.  
R.278:129.  Defendant said he “was scared to death.”  Id.  He was “starting to 
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wig out, just freak out.”  Id.  After a while, Defendant “finally” decided that 
he was going to “go in there and confront this.”  Id.  When he went inside, he 
could hear Teresa on the phone talking with her mother.  R.278:130.  He went 
to the kitchen and got a drink. R.278:131. Teresa then “yelled . . . something” 
to him and he “snapped.” Id. Defendant went “storming in there.”  Id.  He 
saw that Teresa was pointing her cell phone at him.  Id.  He “reached down 
and grabbed the gun” from the open gun safe, “cocked it on the way up,” and 
shot Teresa.  Id.  He then walked over to Teresa and saw that the Beretta was 
on the floor on the other side of the bed. R.278:132. He picked it up and put it 
on the bed. Id.   
 Defense counsel finally elicited from the forensic investigator that the 
Beretta was loaded and that investigators had been unable to obtain 
comparable fingerprints from it. R.277:160-161, 165-167. 
The prosecutor’s hearsay objection to  
Defendant’s testimony about Teresa’s alleged threat 
and defense counsel’s response 
 
 During Defendant’s testimony, the prosecutor made six hearsay 
objections. R.278:98, 106, 110, 113-116, 118-119. The trial court sustained each 
one.  Id.  When Defendant testified that “Wednesday there was a threat 
made” and so when he saw that the gun safe was open, he “thought the threat 
was serious”; the prosecutor did not object. R.278:113. But the prosecutor 
-16- 
objected when Defendant began to answer defense counsel’s question about 
who made the threat.  R.278:113, 114.  The trial court asked counsel to 
approach and instructed defense counsel that “[t]here’s no way that you’re 
going to dance around and get a threat [in] without [it] being hearsay.” 
R.291:113. Defense counsel did not offer any counterargument.  Id.   
 After the sidebar, defense counsel asked Defendant what he was 
thinking when he saw the gun safe open. R.278:113-114.  Defendant began to 
answer that he “was thinking that the threat that I had received the day 
before” when the prosecutor asked to approach.  Id.  The trial court excused 
the jury, then warned defense counsel to stay away from that line of inquiry 
because “the only responses [it was] getting are clearly hearsay.” R.278:115-
116. Defense counsel did not argue that the threat was not hearsay at either 
sidebar.  R.278:113-115.  
 When defense counsel resumed questioning Defendant after the jury 
returned, he did not ask Defendant about the threat but guided him to talk 
about seeing the gun missing from the safe and feeling “scared to death” 
because he “worried that Teresa was going to use that gun to do some harm” 




 In closing, defense counsel assured the jury that he was not asking 
them “to say that . . .what [Defendant] did was right,” but to find that 
Defendant acted under extreme emotional distress. R.280:43, 54, 57.  He 
argued that if Defendant “was under extreme emotion,” the law provided 
that “what he did was not as serious as somebody who does it in cold blood.” 
Id.   
 Defense counsel argued that Defendant suffered from extreme 
emotional distress because his “reason” had been “overborne by intense 
feelings” of “passion, anger, distress, grief, [and] excessive agitation.” 
R.280:48-49 (quoting jury instr. 12). He explained that Defendant’s intense 
feelings arose from “years of fighting” coupled with an escalation of fighting 
in the two weeks before the shooting and “a gun out of the safe.” R.280:50-52. 
He pointed to the loaded Beretta that was sitting on the bed. R.280:52-53.   
 Defense counsel further argued that Defendant was not substantially 
at fault for his extreme emotions. R.280:58. Rather, Teresa was. Id. He 
contended that in the two-week period before the shooting, Defendant did 
not call Teresa names, nor was he “violent with her.” Id.  He argued that 
Teresa, however, started all the fights in this period because she was angry at 
Defendant for doing things like spilling oil in the driveway and using her car.  
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Id.  Teresa also took the gun out of the safe and leered at him several times 
while he was out in the garage.  Id.  R.280:57-59. 
 The prosecutor dismissed Defendant’s extreme emotional distress 
defense. R.280:33. The prosecutor first argued that Teresa and Defendant’s 
history of fighting did not create an unusual and overwhelming stress for 
Defendant because fighting was their norm and Defendant substantially 
contributed to it. R.280:35-38. As for the gun, the prosecutor argued that 
Defendant’s story about Teresa taking it out of the safe was not credible. 
R.280:38-39. Most importantly, the prosecutor said, Defendant never 
mentioned a gun when he called 911. Id. Instead, Defendant calmly and 
collectedly told the dispatcher that he killed his wife because she had been 
complaining about him to her mother and she tried to take his picture. Id. 
Defendant’s story was also not credible, the prosecutor stated, because when 
Defendant shot Teresa, she “was no threat.” R.280:40. The prosecutor pointed 
out that she “was sitting on the bed, semi-reclined, feet crossed, crocheting.” 
Id. “She wasn’t pointing a gun at him,” and she “didn’t provoke him.” Id.  But 
even if the jury were to believe Defendant’s story about the gun, the 
prosecutor argued, Defendant still failed to establish the defense because it 
was not “reasonable” to believe that “Teresa was preparing to kill him” 
where he “didn’t see a gun” and did not know where it was. R.280:41. 
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Jury deliberations and verdict 
 Sometime after being excused to deliberate, the jury sent a note to the 
trial court asking what “the legal definition of ‘substantially caused’” was.  
R.181; R.280:72.  The jury had been instructed that the special mitigation of 
extreme emotional distress did not apply if Defendant’s distress was 
“substantially caused by [his] own conduct.” R.199 (jury instr. 13).   
 Later, the jury sent a note to the trial court stating that it was “at an 
absolute impasse six to two.”  R.280:78; R.182.  The jury explained that “two 
feel that ‘substantially caused’ needs to be ‘the majority of the time.’”  R.182; 
R.280:78. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court gave the jury a 
supplemental instruction, asking it to continue its deliberations “in an effort 
to agree upon a verdict.” R.280:94-95; R.180. After two more hours and 
thirteen minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict, finding 
Defendant guilty of murder. R.280:95-96; R.179, 174. 
 Defendant timely appealed and this Court transferred the case to the 
court of appeals.  R.238, 243. 
The court of appeals’ decision 
 Defendant argued on appeal that his counsel was ineffective because 
when the prosecutor objected that Teresa’s alleged threat was hearsay, he did 
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not argue that it was actually admissible nonhearsay.2  State v. Scott, 2017 UT 
App 74, ¶¶17, 19, 397 P.3d 837.  He also moved under rule 23B, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, for a remand so that he could introduce the words of 
Teresa’s alleged threat into the record. See appellate docket. 
 Without granting Defendant’s rule 23B motion, the court of appeals 
agreed that defense counsel was ineffective. It held that defense counsel 
performed deficiently because he failed “to correctly use the rules of evidence 
to support [Defendant]’s defense” and argue that the alleged threat was not 
hearsay. Id. at ¶25. According to the court of appeals, a reasonable attorney 
would have made such an argument because Teresa’s threat was admissible 
under the rules of evidence and it was “central” to Defendant’s defense 
strategy “to show that his distress originated outside his own behavior.”  Id. 
at ¶¶25, 28. 
 The State had argued that a reasonable attorney may have chosen not 
to pursue admitting the precise words of the threat because omitting the 
specific words of the threat may have allowed the jury to magnify the threat 
beyond its actual words.  The court of appeals rejected that argument.  Id. at 
                                              
2 Defendant also argued that the trial court erred by giving a verdict-
urging instruction. Scott, 2017 UT App, ¶17. Because the court of appeals held 
that trial counsel was ineffective, it did not address this issue.  Id.  
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¶27.  It believed that “the negative repercussions of omitting the content of 
the threat were greater than the possible benefits” where “admitting its 
content would have only strengthened [Defendant]’s defense.” Id. (emphasis 
added). It came to this conclusion even though the precise words of the threat 
were not in the record.  Id. at ¶13 n.2. 
 The court of appeals also held that keeping the precise words of the 
threat from the jury prejudiced Defendant because “the jury was at an 
impasse over whether [Defendant] had substantially caused the distress he 
felt” and testimony of the specific threat and its “effect” on Defendant could 
have caused the jury to remain deadlocked.  Id. at ¶34.  Again, it came to this 
conclusion without the specific wording of the threat being in the record. Id. 
at ¶13 n.2.  And of course, the jury did hear Defendant testify about how the 
threat affected him. R.278:113, 117-118. 
 Judge Voros and Judge Christiansen wrote separate concurring 
opinions that urged the legislature to consider amending the extreme 
emotional distress defense statute so that an abusive intimate partner cannot 
claim special mitigation. Id. at ¶¶36-46. And although Judge Christiansen 
concluded that Defendant did not qualify for the special mitigation here and 
that she did “not believe that hearing the specifics of the alleged threat would 
ultimately have made a difference in the jury’s verdict,” she agreed that 
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remand was “warranted” because “it is ‘not within the province of an 
appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of a front line fact-finder.’” 
Id. at ¶¶43, 45 (Christiansen, J., concurring).  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Deficient Performance. The court of appeals applied an 
incorrect deficient performance standard, and in doing so, incorrectly held 
that defense counsel performed deficiently. First, the court of appeals never 
assessed whether defense counsel’s representation was objectively 
reasonable as Strickland requires. Instead, the court of appeals began and 
ended its deficient performance analysis with assessing whether counsel had 
a sound trial strategy. Whether defense counsel’s action was a sound strategy 
may be one consideration. But it is not alone determinative of objectively 
reasonable representation. Rather, Defendant had to prove that counsel’s 
actual course of action—proceeding on the uncontested testimony that Teresa 
had threatened him and the threat made him fear for his life—fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.  The court of appeals erred because it 
never determined whether Defendant met that burden. And because defense 
counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable here, the court of appeals 
was incorrect when it held that defense counsel performed deficiently.  
Second, the court of appeals erred when it held that defense counsel 
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was deficient for not trying to introduce the words of Teresa’s alleged threat 
when the evidence was admissible and “would have only strengthened his 
case.” As stated, Strickland requires only that defense counsel perform 
objectively reasonably. It does not require counsel to take every action that is 
arguably beneficial to the defense. The court of appeals erred because it never 
determined whether Defendant met that burden. 
 Finally, the record did not support the court of appeals’ conclusion that 
defense counsel performed deficiently. Because the actual content of Teresa’s 
alleged threat is not part of the record, the court of appeals had no evidentiary 
basis to support its conclusion that the “content” of the threat would only 
strengthen the defense, rather than harm it. This was also error. 
 Point II: Prejudice. The court of appeals also erroneously applied 
Strickland’s prejudice standard. First, because the actual content of Teresa’s 
alleged threat is not part of the record, the court of appeals impermissibly 
speculated that the content of Teresa’s alleged threat would have affected the 
outcome of the proceeding had the jury heard it. For this reason alone, this 
Court should reverse. 
 The court of appeals also erroneously held that Defendant had proved 
Strickland prejudice because it did not consider how the jury hearing the 
content of Teresa’s alleged threat would have so changed the entire 
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evidentiary picture that not hearing it undermined confidence in the 
outcome. Rather, the court of appeals considered evidence of Teresa’s threat 
in isolation. Under the correct analysis, the jury hearing the content of 
Teresa’s alleged threat would not have tipped the scales in Defendant’s favor 
or otherwise changed the outcome of the proceeding. The totality of the 
evidence showed that Defendant did not act under distress, but killed Teresa 
because he felt Teresa disrespected and picked on him.  
ARGUMENT 
 A defendant’s burden in proving that defense counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective is well-established. First, the defendant must 
prove that his counsel performed deficiently. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Second, he must prove that his counsel’s deficient 
performance was prejudicial—that there is a reasonable likelihood that, 
absent counsel’s deficient performance, the result at trial would have been 
different. Id. A failure to establish either Strickland element is fatal to an 
ineffectiveness claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697. Moreover, it is “not 
enough” for a defendant to show that “counsels’ performance could have 
been better or that counsels’ performance might have contributed to his 
conviction.” State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258–59 (Utah 1993). Rather, he must 
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show “actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice.” Id. at 1259 
(emphasis in original). 
 “Strickland’s standard, although by no means insurmountable, is 
highly demanding.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). And 
surmounting it “is never an easy task.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 
(2011) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 346, 371 (2010)). The court of 
appeals incorrectly applied Strickland’s standard to hold that Defendant 
surmounted it here.  
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED AN INCORRECT 
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE STANDARD THEREBY 
INCORRECTLY CONCLUDING THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL 
PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY 
 Strickland required Defendant to prove that trial counsel’s 
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.  And “counsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance.”  Id. at 690.  To meet his burden, Defendant 
had to prove that “no competent attorney” would have proceeded as his 
attorney did.  Moore, 562 U.S. at 124. This high standard has its roots in the 
recognition that there “are countless ways to provide effective assistance in 
any given case,” and that “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would 
not defend a particular client in the same way.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
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 The court of appeals failed to hold Defendant to this standard, and by 
that failure disregarded its underlying premise—that there were “countless 
ways” for Defendant’s counsel to “provide [him] effective assistance.” Id. 
Instead, it identified only one of many courses available to counsel and found 
him deficient because he did not follow it. 
The court of appeals concluded that defense counsel was deficient 
because he did not have a “sound” strategic reason for his action. Scott, 2017 
UT App 74, ¶27. But the determinative question under Strickland is not 
whether counsel’s action was strategic, or even sound, but whether counsel’s 
performance was objectively unreasonable. Because the court of appeals 
failed to conduct this analysis—as Strickland requires—and thereby 
incorrectly concluded that counsel was deficient, it erred. 
 Similarly, merely identifying a course of action that may have 
benefitted the defense is not the correct inquiry.  So even if counsel could 
have successfully introduced the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat, 
and even if that evidence arguably would have supported Defendant’s 
defense, that did not prove deficient performance under Strickland.  Rather, 
as stated, Defendant had to prove that counsel’s actual course of action—
proceeding on the uncontested testimony that Teresa had threatened him and 
the threat made him fear for his life—fell below an objective standard of 
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reasonableness.  The court of appeals erred because it never determined 
whether Defendant met that burden. 
 Finally, even the court of appeals’ assessment that counsel had a better 
course of action—that the benefits of admitting the specific words of the 
threat outweighed any detriment—was not supported by the record.  The 
court of appeals could have legitimately reached that conclusion only if the 
specific words of the threat were in the record. They were not. This was also 
error. 
A. The court of appeals applied an incorrect deficient 
performance standard because it never assessed whether 
defense counsel’s representation was objectively 
unreasonable.  
  The court of appeals began and ended its deficient performance 
analysis with assessing whether counsel had a sound trial strategy.  Because 
it found that he did not, it found that he was deficient. 
As explained later, even that finding was incorrect.  But the analysis 
itself was also incorrect.  Defendant had to prove that his counsel’s 
performance was objectively reasonable—in other words, that “no competent 
attorney” would have done as counsel did. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124. Whether 
defense counsel’s action was a sound strategy may be one consideration. But 
it is not alone determinative of objectively reasonable representation. 
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 To establish deficient performance under Strickland, a defendant must 
show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s per-
formance,” however, is “highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. And 
“counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance.”  Id. at 
690.  To prove deficient performance, a defendant must rebut that 
presumption. 
Certainly, whether counsel had a considered strategy for a challenged 
course can inform whether counsel’s representation was reasonable.  Again, 
there is a “strong presumption that under the circumstances the challenged 
action might be considered sound trial strategy,” and a defendant must rebut 
that presumption in order to succeed.  State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶19, 12 
P.3d 92 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This presumption 
exists because of the “widely varying ‘circumstances faced by defense 
counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how to best 
represent a criminal defendant.” Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, ¶113, 388 P.3d 447 
(quoting State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶70, 353 P.3d 55) (alteration in original 
and citation omitted). “Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed 
the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and 
interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.”  
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Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). Reviewing courts thus are 
“required not simply to ‘give [the] attorneys the benefit of the doubt,’ but to 
affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons [defense] counsel may 
have had for proceeding as they did.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 
(2011) (alterations in original and citation omitted).  
 And to rebut the presumption of sound strategy, a defendant must 
“persuad[e] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s 
actions.”  State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original; 
quotations and citations omitted).  The State is not required to articulate a 
reasonable explanation for counsel’s acts or omissions.  Nor does a defendant 
succeed merely because this Court cannot conceive of a tactical explanation 
for counsel’s performance.  Rather, “‘the defendant’” always bears the 
burden to “‘overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’”  Benvenuto v. 
State, 2007 UT 53, ¶19, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see 
also Burt v. Titlow 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (explaining that “burden to ‘show 
that counsel’s performance was deficient’ rests squarely on the defendant”) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  And when it is possible to conceive of a 
reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel’s actions, then a defendant clearly 
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has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel performed 
reasonably.  See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶7. 
 The Strickland presumption of a sound strategy thus can be dispositive, 
but only of a finding of effective performance, not deficient performance. In 
other words, when counsel’s actions appear designed to further a reasonable 
trial strategy, then a defendant has necessarily failed to show objectively 
unreasonable performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Clark, 2004 UT 25, 
¶6 (explaining that defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show that 
“there was no conceivable tactical basis” for counsel’s actions) (emphasis in 
original).   
 But the lack of a considered strategic basis for counsel’s performance 
does not automatically render his performance objectively unreasonable. See 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 
1048, 1050-1051 (10th Cir. 2002).  Even when a considered strategic reason for 
counsel’s performance seems elusive, a defendant still cannot carry his 
burden of proving deficient performance unless he can show that his 
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.  Thus, whether counsel’s course of action is part 
of a considered strategy may be relevant, but it is not controlling.   
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The ultimate question is whether counsel’s performance was 
objectively reasonable. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481. “Even where an 
attorney’s ignorance of relevant law and facts precludes a court from 
characterizing certain actions as strategic (and therefore presumptively 
reasonable),” “the pertinent question under the first prong of Strickland 
remains whether, after considering all the circumstances of the case, the 
attorney's representation was objectively unreasonable.” Bullock, 297 F.3d at 
1050-1051.). The Sixth Amendment requires that counsel’s representation “be 
only objectively reasonable, not flawless or to the highest degree of skill.”  
Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000).  Thus, counsel does not 
necessarily perform deficiently even if he makes “minor mistakes” and 
appears “momentarily confused” during trial.  Id. at 487.  Nor is counsel’s 
action unreasonable simply because “another, possibly more reasonable or 
effective strategy could have been employed.” State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶43, 
328 P.3d 841, abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 
P.3d 1016. Counsel’s performance is deficient under Strickland only when “no 
competent attorney” would have acted similarly.  Moore, 562 U.S. at 124; 
Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that counsel is deficient only when “counsel’s error is so 
egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted 
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similarly”); Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 
even “if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel 
did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is 
shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done 
so”).  
 Because counsel need not have a strategic reason for his every act, the 
court of appeal’s analysis of counsel’s performance here misapprehended 
Strickland’s deficient performance standard when it focused solely on 
whether counsel proceeded under a sound strategy. The measure of deficient 
performance is not, as the court of appeals held, whether defense counsel 
could have made a successful nonhearsay argument. Nor is the measure 
whether evidence of Teresa’s alleged threat would have benefited 
Defendant’s defense.  Rather, the question is whether this evidence was so 
necessary, and the potential for conviction so great without it, that counsel’s 
failure to make the nonhearsay argument was objectively unreasonable. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In other words, no competent attorney would have 
failed to make that argument. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124; see also State v. Houston, 
2015 UT 40, ¶76, 353 P.3d 55 (noting that when a defendant claims his counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to prosecutor’s closing argument, “the 
question is ‘not whether the prosecutor’s comments were proper, but 
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whether they were so improper that counsel’s only defensible choice was to 
interrupt those comments with an objection’”) (quoting Bussard v. Lockhart, 
32 F.3d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 The court of appeals never took this step. True, the court of appeals did 
state that “counsel’s failure to correctly argue the rules of evidence fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶24. But it 
never articulated how. And while it rejected the State’s proffered strategic 
explanation for counsel’s action, the court did not—as Strickland requires—
explain why the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat were so necessary, 
and the potential for conviction so great without them, that no competent 
attorney would have failed to make a nonhearsay argument in answer to the 
prosecutor’s hearsay objection. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Moore, 562 U.S. 
at 124; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481; Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1050-1051. Instead, it 
simply rested on its determination that defense counsel’s strategy was 
unsound. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶¶27-28. As shown, under Strickland, this is 
insufficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 It is also incorrect. Defense counsel performed objectively reasonably 
here.  
 The “inquiry into counsel’s performance should focus on ‘whether 
counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.’” 
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Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶76, 344 P.3d 581 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688); see also Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1050-1051 (“[T]he pertinent question under 
the first prong of Strickland remains whether, after considering all the 
circumstances of the case, the attorney’s representation was objectively 
unreasonable.”).   
 Defense counsel faced difficult circumstances here. Defendant 
admitted he shot and killed Teresa. R.280:62; State’s Ex.1. He explained to the 
911 operator that he shot Teresa because she had been talking on “the phone 
with her mother complaining about” Defendant, and that Teresa had been 
“trying to take a picture” of him. R.280:63-64; State’s Ex.1. This confession 
was recorded. State’s Ex.1. On the recording, Defendant calmly and 
dispassionately describes killing his wife and the reasons why he did. Id. And 
minutes before he shot Teresa, Teresa’s mother heard Defendant pick up the 
other handset to listen in on their phone conversation and then exclaim, “My 
wife and my mother-in-law are saying bad things about me.” R.279:53-54, 57. 
When he was arrested, he told his officer friend that he “‘thought it would be 
worth it, but [it was] not.’”  R.277:95; R.278:30. 
 In addition, Defendant had a prior conviction for domestic violence 
against Teresa. R.278:88-89, 152. He used the name “Bitch Teresa” for her in 
his cell phone. R.278:150; State’s Ex.29. At least one neighbor had been 
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concerned for Teresa’s wellbeing. R.279:34. And his two children had 
witnessed him punch Teresa, emotionally denigrate her, and attempt to kill 
her before. R.279:77, 82, 86, 90-91, 115-118, 127, 150.  
 And although Defendant claimed that Teresa threatened him, no one 
else had ever heard her threaten Defendant or get “physical” with him as he 
had with her. R.297:87, 91, 117, 127. Moreover, Teresa’s alleged threat was 
made three days before Defendant shot her, but during that time Defendant 
never told anyone, called the police, or went somewhere else to stay. Instead, 
he took Ambien and slept by her side. R.278:113-129. 
 Defense counsel did well with what he had. Under these facts, 
Defendant could not credibly claim self-defense. See Utah Code Annotated § 
76-2-402(1)(b) (West 2017) (providing killing another is justified only when 
deadly force is “necessary” to defend against “another person’s imminent use 
of unlawful force”). But by raising the special mitigation defense of extreme 
emotional distress, defense counsel could try to mitigate Defendant’s 
confession in the 911 recording phone call as well as use Defendant’s 
tumultuous relationship with Teresa to claim that he had been overcome by 
emotion when he shot her. See Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5(1)(b) (West 
2017) (providing special mitigation when actor suffered “extreme emotional 
distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse”).  
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 But contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, Teresa’s alleged threat 
was not a big piece of this defense. Because Defendant’s 911 phone call 
demonstrated that Defendant had killed Teresa in anger and frustration, 
defense counsel could not rely alone on Defendant’s fear of Teresa harming 
him. Defense counsel thus argued that Defendant was overcome by an array 
of emotions—rage, stress, anger, frustration, and fear. 
 Moreover, Defendant testified that he felt threatened by Teresa in 
many ways—the open safe, the missing gun, Teresa opening the garage door 
and leering at him, and Teresa being angry with him and starting fights. 
R.278:94, 97-98, 105-109, 112, 117, 124-129. Again, Teresa’s alleged verbal 
threat was only a part of this defense. 
 And Defendant was allowed to testify that “there was a threat made.”  
R.278:113. He continued that when he later saw Teresa in front of the gun safe 
and that a Beretta was missing, he believed the threat was serious. Id. He told 
the jury that this made him “scared to death,” and made him believe that 
Teresa intended to harm him. R.278:117. 
With all this in mind, when Defendant drew an objection as he began 
to testify about what Teresa actually said when she allegedly threatened him, 
defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that he need not respond 
to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection by arguing that the words were 
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nonhearsay. By that time, the trial court had already sustained several 
hearsay objections made by the prosecutor. Defense counsel could have 
reasonably concluded from the judge’s strong admonition against inquiring 
into the specific words of the threat that he was not likely to succeed in getting 
the words of the threat admitted. R.291:113. And where the jury had already 
heard ample testimony that Defendant believed Teresa had threatened him, 
he “thought the threat was serious,” and he believed Teresa intended to harm 
him, defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that getting the 
specific wording of Teresa’s threat was not so necessary to the defense that it 
was worth pressing the issue further. R.278:113-114, 117. Indeed, a reasonable 
attorney could conclude that he already had more than enough to add the 
threat piece to the larger extreme emotional disturbance puzzle—Defendant 
testified that he was afraid of Teresa because she had threatened him, he 
believed she had a gun, and he believed she intended to use it. 
 And certainly, while the record is silent as to the precise words of 
Teresa’s alleged threat, defense counsel knew what they were. Richter, 562 
U.S. at 105 (“Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the 
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted 
with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.”). And knowing 
what the specific words of the threat were, counsel could have reasonably 
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concluded that introducing the precise words would not have been so 
materially more helpful to Defendant’s defense that it was critical to get them 
into evidence. By leaving the specific words to the jury’s imagination, counsel 
could magnify the effect of Defendant’s testimony, allowing the jury to 
believe that the threat was greater than what it actually may have been. 
 The court of appeals ignored the global analysis that Strickland 
required and instead assigned determinative significance to a single event.  It 
therefore ignored Strickland’s directive to not “second-guess” defense 
counsel’s performance on the basis of an inanimate record. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689.  And it ignored the directive to presume that in the context of the entire 
case, counsel’s representation was reasonable. 
“The Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care.” 
Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.  Because the court of appeals failed to do so here—
and incorrectly concluded that defense counsel performed deficiently in the 
process—this Court should reverse. 
B. The court of appeals incorrectly construed Strickland to 
require counsel to act when it will benefit the defense. 
The court of appeals also erred when it held that defense counsel was 
deficient for not trying to introduce the words of Teresa’s alleged threat 
because, according to the court, this evidence was admissible and “would 
have only strengthened his case.” Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶27. As shown 
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above, Strickland requires only that defense counsel perform objectively 
reasonably. It does not require counsel to take every action that is arguably 
beneficial to the defense. 
The court of appeals held that defense counsel was deficient here 
because a reasonable attorney, in response to the prosecutor’s hearsay 
objection, would have argued that Teresa’s threat was admissible 
nonhearsay. Id. at ¶25. The reason why, according to the court of appeals, was 
that Teresa’s threat was “central” to Defendant’s defense and “admitting its 
content would have only strengthened” his case. Id. at ¶27. In other words, 
the court of appeals concluded that because counsel could have made an 
argument to overcome the prosecutor’s hearsay objection and doing so 
would have only “strengthen[ed]” his case, the Sixth Amendment required 
counsel to make that argument. 
 The court of appeals’ decision follows a pattern of Utah decisions 
incorrectly finding that counsel’s representation is per se deficient when the 
court concludes that counsel omitted an objection or argument that may have 
advanced the defense.  See State v. Lewis, 2014 UT App 241, ¶13, 337 P.3d 1053 
(finding counsel deficient where there “was no conceivable tactical benefit” to 
foregoing instruction); State v. Doutre, 2014 UT App 192, ¶24, 335 P.3d 366 (“If 
clearly inadmissible evidence has no conceivable benefit to a defendant, the 
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failure to object to it on nonfrivilous grounds cannot ordinarily be considered 
a reasonable trial strategy.”); State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, ¶22, 169 P.3d 806 
(finding counsel deficient where the court could “see no tactical advantage for 
not objecting to the clearly erroneous jury instruction”); State v. Ott, 2010 UT 
1, ¶38, 247 P.3d 344 (holding that if evidence has no “conceivable beneficial 
value to defendant,” failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy).   
 But this is incorrect. Merely because counsel could have successfully 
made an argument, and that doing so may have supported the defendant’s 
defense, is never enough to prove deficient performance under Strickland. 
Rather, the determinative inquiry is, as always, “whether a reasonable, 
competent lawyer could have chosen the strategy that was employed in the 
real-time context of trial.” State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶14, 355 P.3d 1031 
(quotation marks omitted). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. at 481. Stated differently, a defendant must prove that no reasonable 
attorney would have taken the same action that his counsel did. Moore, 562 
U.S. at 124.  
 The United States Supreme Court thus “has never required defense 
counsel to pursue every claim or defense,” nor has it required “counsel to 
raise every nonfrivilous defense.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 
127 (2009). In each case, counsel faces a “range of legitimate decisions 
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regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.’” Met, 2016 UT 51, ¶113 
(quoting Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶70) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
And within that range of possible decisions, each choice may be legitimate. 
Id. As Strickland explained, “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective 
assistance in any given case.” 466 U.S. at 689. 
 As a result, “no Supreme Court precedent establish[es] a ‘nothing to 
lose’ standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.” Mirzayance, 556 
U.S. at 122. Nor does it establish a “‘[n]o actual tactical advantage was to be 
gained’” standard. Id. at 122 n.3. Rather, the analysis is the same:  whether the 
action counsel actually took was objectively reasonable. 
 Contrary to the court of appeals’ holding, then, merely because counsel 
here did not present an argument that may have been successful is not 
dispositive. Defense counsel is permitted to choose a strategy within the wide 
“range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant.’” Met, 2016 UT 51, ¶113. And as long as his choice is reasonable, 
defense counsel performed effectively, regardless of the merits of the other 
possible choices.  
As shown in Point I.A. above, defense counsel performed objectively 
reasonably here. Merely because he could have made another choice—to 
argue that the words of Teresa’s alleged threat were not hearsay—does not 
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change this conclusion. The court of appeals erroneously held that it did. See 
Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶43 (explaining that counsel’s actions are not 
unreasonable simply because “another, possibly more reasonable or effective 
strategy could have been employed”); Rogers, 13 F.3d at 386 (holding that 
even “if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel 
did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is 
shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done 
so”). This Court should reverse for this reason as well.  
C. Because the actual content of the threat was not part of the 
record, the court of appeals had no evidentiary basis to support 
its conclusion that the “content” of the threat would only 
strengthen the defense, rather than harm it. 
 Finally, the record did not support the finding on which the court of 
appeals based its deficient performance holding. The court of appeals held 
that “the negative repercussions of omitting the content of the threat were 
greater than the possible benefits; admitting its content would only have 
strengthened [Defendant]’s defense.” Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶27. Likewise, 
it stated that a “serious threat to [Defendant] from Teresa would have been an 
important piece of evidence at trial.” Id. at ¶25 (emphasis added). 
But the precise words of the threat are not part of the record. Id. at ¶13 
n.2 (explaining that Defendant’s “testimony did not include the actual words 
of the threat” and the “threat’s content is not included in the record on 
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appeal”).3  The court of appeals thus did not know if the threat was “serious.” 
Id. at ¶25. Nor could it determine whether “the negative repercussions of 
omitting the content of the threat were greater than the possible benefits” or 
if “admitting its content would only have strengthened [Defendant]’s 
defense.” Id. at ¶27.  
 Without knowing the content of the threat, concluding that it 
necessarily would have strengthened the defense was mere speculation. 
However, “proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative 
matter but must be a demonstrable reality.” State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30, 
253 P.3d 1082 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). And where 
“the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies 
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively.”  Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶17. By determining that the 
unknown contents of Teresa’s alleged threat would have only strengthened 
Defendant’s defense, the court of appeals turned this presumption on its 
head. But “[i]t should go without saying that the absence of evidence cannot 
overcome the “‘strong presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within the 
                                              
3 Defendant filed a motion under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, to introduce evidence of the content of Teresa’s alleged threat into 
the record on appeal. See appellate docket. The court of appeals did not grant, 
or deny, that motion. 
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wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 17 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
 As it was, the jury heard Defendant testify that Teresa threatened him 
and that the threat caused him to fear for his life. R.278:113, 117. But without 
knowing the precise words of this alleged threat, it would be just as likely 
that they would have led the jury to conclude that Defendant’s fear was 
unfounded rather than to conclude the opposite. Indeed, the court of appeals 
conceded as much. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶27. But if the first is true, then 
counsel chose wisely by not pressing the issue. And without knowing what 
those words were, there is no basis for concluding that they would have made 
the defense stronger, let alone so materially stronger that no competent 
attorney would have let the trial proceed without arguing that they were 
admissible nonhearsay. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30; Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 17. 
 The court of appeals thus erred.  This Court should reverse for this 
reason as well. 
**** 
For all of the reasons argued, the court of appeals incorrectly held that 
Defendant’s counsel was deficient when he did not attempt to overcome the 
hearsay objection to the precise words of the threat and relied instead on 
Defendant’s uncontested testimony that Teresa had threatened him and the 
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threat frightened him, in order to support the “threat” component of his 
larger extreme emotional disturbance theory. 
II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED 
STRICKLAND’S PREJUDICE STANDARD 
 The court of appeals also erroneously concluded that Defendant was 
prejudiced when defense counsel did not get the precise words of Teresa’s 
threat admitted. The court of appeals concluded that there was a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have remained deadlocked had it heard 
“more evidence” on what it deemed to be the “central,” disputed point. Scott, 
2017 UT App 74, ¶¶28, 33. Because Defendant “was not allowed to offer any 
other information regarding the threat, including the surrounding 
circumstances, the words used, and the effect it had on him,” and his defense 
counsel did not address the threat again, the court of appeals held that the 
jury could have been “influenced” to remain deadlocked had it heard the 
specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat. Id. at ¶¶33-34. This was especially 
so, the court of appeals believed, because the prosecutor asserted in closing 
that “Teresa was no threat” and that Defendant had no reasonable basis for 
believing that she was a threat.  Id. at ¶33. 
 This analysis falls short of what Strickland requires. To prove prejudice 
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant “must show that 
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there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694. A “[r]easonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.” Id. But “‘[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is 
never an easy task.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citation omitted).  The 
“likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable,” 
Richter, 562 U.S. at 112, such that counsel’s error “‘actually had an adverse 
effect on the defense.’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 693). In addition, the defendant’s proof of prejudice 
“cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.” 
Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30 (quotations and citation omitted). That is, he “has 
the difficult burden of showing . . . actual prejudice.” Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1259 
(emphasis in original). 
 In assessing whether a defendant has carried his burden, appellate 
courts “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This “requires . . . a probing and fact-specific 
analysis.” Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 955 (2010) (per curiam). And the 
appellate court must take into account that some of the facts underpinning 
the defendant’s convictions will be completely unaffected by counsel’s 
alleged errors, while those that are affected may be affected in trivial ways. 
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Id. at 695-96. Errors that have an “isolated” or “trivial effect” on the verdict 
are not prejudicial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96.  Thus, at a minimum, the 
reviewing must consider each of counsel’s alleged deficiencies in the context 
of the inculpatory evidence presented at trial and demonstrate how counsel’s 
alleged deficiency would have so altered the evidentiary landscape that a 
more favorable outcome would be reasonably probable. Id.  
The court of appeals failed to apply this standard. First, without 
knowing the content of Teresa’s alleged threat, the court of appeals 
impermissibly speculated that the content of the threat was both serious and 
would have affected the outcome of the proceeding. Second, the court of 
appeals did not evaluate the totality of the evidence before the jury, but 
instead considered evidence of Teresa’s alleged threat in isolation. 
A. The court of appeals impermissibly speculated that the content 
of Teresa’s alleged threat would have affected the outcome of 
the proceeding had the jury heard it. 
 As stated, the content of Teresa’s alleged threat is not in the record on 
appeal. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶13 n.2. But as discussed above, the court of 
appeals, without knowing the content of the threat, concluded that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different if the jury had heard the 
content of the threat.  Without having the content of the threat in the record, 
however, that conclusion was mere speculation. 
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Speculation is not enough.  The Strickland standard requires “actual 
prejudice.” Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1259 (emphasis in original). And “proof of 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a 
demonstrable reality.” Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30. 
 Because the precise words of Teresa’s alleged threat are not in the 
record, there was no basis to conclude that hearing them would have so 
changed the total evidentiary picture that omitting them undermines 
confidence in the outcome.  Indeed, without have those words in the record, 
there is no basis to reject the possibility that they were just as likely to cause 
the jury to conclude that Defendant’s fear was unfounded.  
The record was thus legally insufficient to support the court of appeals’ 
finding that Defendant had proved prejudice.  Its prejudice holding fails for 
this reason alone.  And because prejudice is a necessary element of an 
ineffective assistance claim, the entire claim fails for this reason alone.  
B. The court of appeals erroneously held that Defendant had 
proved Strickland prejudice because it did not consider how 
the jury hearing the content of Teresa’s alleged threat would 
have so changed the entire evidentiary picture that not hearing 
it undermined confidence in the outcome. 
 The court of appeals also did not consider “the totality of the evidence” 
before the jury, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, in “a probing, fact-specific 
analysis,” Sears, 561 U.S. at 955. Rather, the court of appeals considered 
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Teresa’s alleged threat in isolation of other evidence presented at trial and in 
doing so, incorrectly magnified the importance of this small piece of 
evidence. 
But when considered under the correct standard—in light of all the 
evidence presented at trial—there is no likelihood of a different outcome 
here. Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. To prove special mitigation of extreme emotional 
distress, Defendant must have proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he acted “under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which 
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
205.5(1)(b) (West Supp. 2012). This means he must have been “‘exposed to 
extremely unusual and overwhelming stress’ that would cause the average 
reasonable person under the same circumstances to ‘experience a loss of self-
control’ and ‘be overborne by intense feelings, such as passion, anger, 
distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.’”  State v. White, 
2011 UT 21, ¶26, 251 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Utah 
1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)).  
But, the emotional distress cannot be “substantially caused by the 
Defendant’s own conduct.” Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5(3)(b). And “a 
reasonable person facing the same situation would have reacted in a similar 
way.” White, 2011 UT 21, ¶37.  
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 Defendant could not prove that he acted under extreme emotional 
distress. His theory was simply unbelievable. Indeed, the totality of the 
evidence showed that Defendant did not act under distress, let alone distress 
that was “extreme[]” or “unusual.” Id. at ¶26. Nor would a reasonable person 
have reacted in the same way Defendant did here. Id.  The evidence, instead, 
proved that Defendant killed Teresa because he felt she disrespected and 
picked on him. 
 The jury heard the 911 call where Defendant calmly and 
dispassionately explained to the dispatcher that he killed Teresa because she 
had been talking on “the phone with her mother complaining about” 
Defendant, and that Teresa had been “trying to take a picture” of him.  
R.280:63-64; State’s Ex.1.  This explanation was corroborated by Teresa’s 
mother’s testimony that she heard Defendant pick up another handset to 
listen in on their phone conversation and then exclaim, “My wife and my 
mother-in-law are saying bad things about me.” R.279:53-54, 57. And the fact 
that within seventeen minutes Teresa was dead, further validated that this 
was the actual trigger for the murder.  State’s Ex. 29 & 30.    
 When he was arrested, Defendant told his friend Officer Howell that 
he “‘thought it would be worth it, but [it was] not.’”  R.277:95; R.278:30.  This 
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statement shows deliberation and purposefulness, not a sudden loss of self-
control.  See Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5(1)(b).    
 In addition, Defendant’s prior violence and threatening behavior 
toward Teresa undercut his defense that this was an out-of-character, 
extreme, overwrought response to a triggering event.  See Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-5-205.5(1)(b); White, 2011 UT 21, ¶26.  Indeed, Defendant’s 
violence against Teresa was routine.  Defendant had a prior conviction for 
domestic violence against Teresa. R.278:88-89, 152. At least one neighbor had 
been concerned for Teresa’s wellbeing after seeing how Defendant treated 
her. R.279:34. And his two children had witnessed him punch Teresa, 
emotionally denigrate her, and attempt to kill her before. R.279:77, 82, 86, 90-
91, 115-118, 127, 150. 
 And although Defendant claimed that Teresa threatened him, no one 
else had ever heard her threaten Defendant or get “physical” with him as he 
had with her. R.297:87, 91, 117, 127. Moreover, Teresa’s alleged threat was 
made three days before Defendant shot her, and during that time Defendant 
never told anyone, called the police, or went somewhere else to stay. Instead, 
he took Ambien and slept by her side. R.278:113-129. 
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 Indeed, Defendant’s mitigation defense was presented for the first time 
at trial.  In his 911 call and his statements to friends and police, he never 
mentioned any threat, his fear of Teresa, or any missing gun.   
 And Teresa was no threat. When he shot her, Teresa was sitting on her 
bed, crocheting.  R.277:131. Even Defendant admitted that he never saw her 
with a gun; he knew she was only holding a cell phone.  State’s Ex. 1; 
R.278:164, 169-170.  The evidence against Defendant was overwhelming. 
Hearing the specifics of Teresa’s alleged threat would not have changed this 
evidentiary picture or the outcome. Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. 
 Contrary to the court of appeals’ opinion, Teresa’s alleged threat was 
not a “central” piece of Defendant’s defense. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶28. The 
specific words of the threat even less so. Defendant’s defense was not self-
defense or that he was acting solely in fear. Rather, his defense was that he 
was overcome by an array of emotions—rage, stress, anger, frustration, and 
fear. His fear of Teresa was thus just one part of that array.  
 True, Defendant did endeavor to portray Teresa as the cause of his 
distress and emotions, but again, the evidence he relied on was not just that 
Teresa threatened him. The defense also presented—and focused on— 
evidence that Teresa nitpicked Defendant, would not let issues go, was 
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continually angry with him, and started all the fights in the two-week period 
before Defendant shot her. R.280:57-59.  
 And the jury did hear that Defendant believed Teresa had threatened 
him. It heard Defendant’s entire mitigation defense on this point: Teresa had 
threatened him, he believed she had a gun, and he was afraid that she was 
going to use the gun to harm him. R.278:110-118.  Defendant testified that 
combined with the couple’s history of fighting and Teresa continuing to 
threaten him by “leaning out the door and just staring” at him, Defendant 
“just freak[ed] out.”  R.278:128-129.  Adding the specifics of Teresa’s alleged 
threat was thus unlikely to have added enough to overcome all the other 
evidence undercutting the extreme emotional disturbance theory. Richter, 562 
U.S. at 111. And even the specifics would have required the jury to believe 
Defendant’s uncorroborated testimony weighed against third-party witness 
accounts and Defendant’s recorded 911 call coldly reporting that he had 
killed his wife for reasons wholly unrelated to any threat. 
 The court of appeals focused on the prosecutor’s closing argument that 
Teresa was not a threat and that defense counsel did not mention the threat 
again during the trial to find prejudice. But the prosecutor argued that Teresa 
was not a threat when Defendant shot her: she was sitting on her bed, 
crocheting, and Defendant did not see her holding the gun. That was 
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undisputed and knowing the precise words of the threat made three days 
earlier was irrelevant to that argument.  And the fact that defense counsel did 
not further highlight Teresa’s alleged threat only further emphasizes how 
unimportant the threat was to the overall defense theory. 
 Moreover, merely because that the jury was at an impasse for any 
period demonstrates not that defense counsel was ineffective, or that 
Defendant was prejudiced, but how well defense counsel performed here.  
Defense counsel was able to misdirect the jury’s focus to whether Defendant 
or Teresa was substantially more responsible for their tumultuous 
relationship. But the question whether Defendant or Teresa caused most of 
their fights was irrelevant. Rather, to prove special mitigation, Defendant had 
to show that “a reasonable person facing the same situation would have 
reacted in a similar way” and that the emotional distress he felt was not 
“substantially caused by the Defendant’s own conduct.” Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-5-205.5(3)(b). The hen-pecked husband defense does not meet 
this standard.  
 In sum, the court of appeals did not analyze or explain how the specific 
words of Teresa’s alleged threat would have so changed the entire 
evidentiary picture that not hearing them undermines confidence in the 
verdict. Under the correct analysis, the jury hearing the content of Teresa’s 
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alleged threat would not have tipped the scales in Defendant’s favor or 
otherwise changed the outcome of the proceeding. Indeed, Judge 
Christiansen concluded that “hearing the specifics of the alleged threat” 
would not have “ultimately have made a difference in the jury’s verdict.” 
Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶¶43, 45 (Christiansen, J., concurring).4 The court of 
appeals erroneously found that Defendant had proved prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of 
appeals’ holding that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel. This Court should then reinstate Defendant’s conviction for murder 
and remand the matter to the court of appeals to address Defendant’s 
remaining verdict-urging instruction claim. 
                                              
4 She nevertheless voted to reverse because “it is ‘not within the 
province of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of a front 
line fact-finder.’” Id.  This clearly misstated the law.  It is a reviewing court’s 
duty to assess prejudice by predicting how a jury would have decided the 
case. See Sears, 561 U.S. at 955-956 (explaining Strickland prejudice standard 
“necessarily require[s] a court to ‘speculate’” as to how evidence would have 
affected the outcome of the proceeding). After concluding that hearing the 
specifics of the alleged threat would not have made a difference in the verdict, 
Judge Christiansen should have dissented. 
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